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We study the merging and the testing of opinions in the context of a pre-
diction model. In the absence of incentive problems, opinions can be tested
and rejected, regardless of whether or not data produces consensus among
Bayesian agents. In contrast, in the presence of incentive problems, opin-
ions can only be tested and rejected when data produces consensus among
Bayesian agents. These results show a strong connection between the test-
ing and the merging of opinions. They also relate the literature on Bayesian
learning and the literature on testing strategic experts.
1. Introduction. Data can produce consensus among Bayesian agents who
initially disagree. It can also test and reject opinions. We relate these two critical
uses of data in a model where agents may strategically misrepresent what they
know.
In each period, either 0 or 1 is observed. Let P and Q be two probability mea-
sures on {0,1}∞ such that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P . If P
and Q are σ -additive then, as shown by Blackwell and Dubins (1962), the condi-
tional probabilities of P and Q merge, in the sense that the two posteriors become
uniformly close as the amount of observations increases (Q-almost surely). So,
repeated applications of Bayes’ rule lead to consensus among Bayesian agents,
provided that their opinions were initially compatible.
Now consider Savage’s axiomatization of subjective probability. He proposed
postulates that characterize a preference relation over bets in terms of a nonatomic
finitely additive probability P . Call such P , for short, an opinion. Savage’s frame-
work allows for finitely additive probabilities that are not σ -additive. In particular,
the conclusions of the Blackwell and Dubins theorem hold for some, but not all,
opinions. This flexibility makes Savage’s framework an ideal candidate to study
the connection between the merging and the testing of opinions.
We say that an opinion P satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property if whenever Q
is an opinion absolutely continuous with respect to P , the two conditional proba-
bilities merge. By definition, in this subframework, sufficient data produces agree-
ment among Bayesian agents who have compatible initial opinions. Outside this
subframework, Bayesian agents may satisfy Savage’s axioms, have compatible ini-
tial opinions and yet persistently disagree. See the Appendix for an example.
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Any opinion, whether or not it satisfies the Blackwell and Dubins property, can
be tested and rejected. To reject an opinion P , it suffices to find an event that has
low probability according to P and then reject it if this event is observed. Thus,
if opinions are honestly reported then the connection between merging and testing
opinions is weak. In the absence of incentive problems, subjective probabilities
can be tested and rejected whether or not data produces consensus.
Now consider the case in which a self-proclaimed expert, named Bob, may
strategically misrepresent what he knows. Let Alice be a tester who wants to de-
termine whether Bob is an informed expert who honestly reports what he believes
or he is an uninformed, but strategic, expert who has reputational concerns and
wants to pass Alice’s test. Alice faces an adverse selection problem and uses data
to screen the two types of experts.
A test is likely to control for type I error if an informed expert expects to pass
the test by truthfully reporting what he believes. A test can be manipulated if even
completely uninformed experts are likely to pass the test, no matter how the data
unfolds in the future. The word “likely” refers to a possible randomization by the
strategic expert to manipulate the test. Only nonmanipulable tests that control for
type I error pass informed experts and may fail uninformed ones.
Our main results are: In the presence of incentive problems, if opinions must sat-
isfy the Blackwell–Dubins property then there exists a test that controls for type I
error and cannot be manipulated. If, instead, any opinion is allowed then every
test that controls for type I error can be manipulated. Thus, in Savage’s frame-
work strategic experts cannot be discredited. However, strategic experts can be
discredited if opinions are restricted to a subframework where data produces con-
sensus among Bayesian agents with initially compatible views. These results show
a strong connection between the merging and the testing of opinions but only under
incentive problems.
The Blackwell–Dubins theorem has an additional interpretation. In this inter-
pretation, Q is referred to as the data generating process and P is an agent’s belief
initially compatible with Q. When the conclusions of the Blackwell–Dubins the-
orem hold, then P and Q merge and so, the agent’s predictions are eventually
accurate. Thus, multiple repetitions of Bayes’ rule transforms the available evi-
dence into a near perfect guide to the future. It follows that our main results also
have an additional interpretation. Under incentive problems, strategic experts can
only be discredited if they are restricted to a subframework where opinions that
are compatible with the data generating process are eventually accurate.
Finally, our results relate the literatures on Bayesian learning and the literature
on testing strategic experts (see the next section for references). They show a strong
connection between the framework under which Bayesian learning leads to accu-
rate opinions and the framework under which strategic experts can be discredited.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 re-
views the Blackwell–Dubins theorem and defines the Blackwell–Dubins property.
Section 4 contains our main results. Section 5 relates our results and category tests.
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Section 6 considers the case where the set of per-period outcome may be infinite.
The Appendix contains all proofs and a formal example of a probability that does
not satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins property.
1.1. Related literature. Blackwell and Dubins’ idea of merging of opinions
is central in the theory of Bayesian learning and Bayesian statistics. In Bayesian
nonparametric statistics, see the seminal work of Diaconis and Freedman (1986),
D’Aristotile, Diaconis and Freedman (1988) and the more recent work by Walker,
Lijoi and Pruenster (2005). In the theory of Bayesian learning, see Schervish and
Seidenfeld (1990). We refer to Dawid (1985) for a connection with the theory of
calibration.
In game theory, the Blackwell–Dubins theorem is central in the study of con-
vergence to Nash equilibrium in repeated games. The main objective is to under-
stand the conditions under which Bayesian learning leads to a Nash equilibrium
[see, among many contributions, Foster and Young (2001, 2003), Fudenberg and
Kreps (1993), Fudenberg and Levine (1998, 2009), Hart and Mas-Colell (2013),
Jackson, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1999), Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b), Lehrer
and Smorodinsky (1996a, 1996b), Monderer, Samet and Sela (1997), Nachbar
(1997, 2001, 2005), Sandroni (1998) and Young (2002, 2004)].
A series of papers investigate whether empirical tests can be manipulated. In
statistics, see Foster and Vohra (1998), Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), Vovk
and Shafer (2005) and Olszewski and Sandroni (2009a). In economics, see among
several contributions, Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008), Al-Najjar et al. (2010),
Babaioff et al. (2011), Dekel and Feinberg (2006), Feinberg and Lambert (2011),
Feinberg and Stewart (2008), Fortnow and Vohra (2009), Fudenberg and Levine
(1999), Gradwohl and Salant (2011), Gradwohl and Shmaya (2013), Hu and
Shmaya (2013), Lehrer (2001), Olszewski and Peski (2011), Olszewski and San-
droni (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011), Sandroni (2003), Sandroni, Smorodinsky
and Vohra (2003), Shmaya (2008), Stewart (2011). For a review, see Foster and
Vohra (2011) and Olszewski and Peski (2011). See also Al-Najjar, Pomatto and
Sandroni (2013) for a companion paper.
2. Setup. In every period an outcome, 0 or 1, is observed (all results gen-
eralize to the case of finitely many outcomes). A path is an infinite sequence of
outcomes and  = {0,1}∞ is the set of all paths. Given a path ω and a period t , let
ωt ⊆  be the cylinder of length t with base ω. That is, ωt is the set of all paths
which coincide with ω in the first t periods. The set of all paths  is endowed with
a σ -algebra of events  containing all cylinders.
The set  is endowed with the product topology. In this topology, a set is open
if and only if it is a countable union of cylinders. We denote by 1 the set of all
open subsets of  and by B the Borel σ -algebra generated by the topology. Note
that 1 ⊂ B ⊆ .
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Let P be the set of all finitely additive probabilities on (,). A probability
P ∈ P is strongly nonatomic, or Savagean, if for every event E and every α ∈ [0,1]
there is an event F ⊆ E such that P(F) = αP (E). The term “Savagean” empha-
sizes the relation between strongly nonatomic probabilities and the Savage (1954)
representation theorem: a finitely additive probability corresponds to a preference
relation satisfying Savage’s axioms if and only if it is strongly nonatomic. To sim-
plify the language, we also refer to a Savagean probability as an opinion. Let 
denotes the set of all opinions.
At time 0, a self-proclaimed expert, named Bob, announces an opinion P .
A tester, named Alice, evaluates his opinion empirically. Alice announces her test
at period 0, before Bob announces his opinion.
DEFINITION 1. A test is a function T : → 1.
A test specifies an open set T (P ) considered inconsistent with an opinion P . An
expert who announces opinion P is rejected on every path ω belonging to T (P ).
For the next definition, fix ε ∈ [0,1) and a subset 	 of .
DEFINITION 2. A test 	-controls for type I error with probability 1 − ε if for
any P ∈ 	,
P
(
T (P )
)≤ ε.
If a test 	-controls for type I error, then an expert (with an opinion in 	) expects
to pass the test by honestly reporting what he believes.
2.1. Strategic forecasting. We now consider the case where Bob is unin-
formed about the odds of future events, but may produce an opinion strategically
in order to pass the test. We allow strategic experts to select opinions at random.
Let f be the set of probability measures on  with finite support. We call each
ζ ∈ f a strategy.
DEFINITION 3. A test can be manipulated with probability q ∈ [0,1] if there
is a strategy ζ such that for every ω ∈ ,
ζ
({
P ∈  :ω /∈ T (P )})≥ q.
If a test is manipulable with high probability, then a uninformed, but strategic
expert is likely to pass the test regardless of how the data unfolds and how much
data is available.
DEFINITION 4. A test is nonmanipulable if for every strategy ζ there is a
cylinder Cζ such that for every path ω ∈ Cζ ,
ζ
({
P ∈  :ω /∈ T (P )})= 0.
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Nonmanipulable tests can reject uninformed experts. No matter which strategy
Bob employs, there is a finite history that, if observed, discredits him. These are
the only tests that are likely to pass informed experts and may reject uninformed
ones.
3. Merging of opinions. We now review the main concepts behind the
Blackwell–Dubins theorem.
DEFINITION 5. Let P,Q ∈ P. The probability P merges with Q if for every
ε > 0
lim
t→∞Q
({
ω : sup
E∈
∣∣P (E|ωt )−Q(E|ωt )∣∣> ε})= 0.
The expression supE∈ |P(E|ωt)−Q(E|ωt)| is the distance between the fore-
casts of P and Q, conditional on the evidence available at time t and along the
path ω. The probability P merges with Q if, under Q, this distance goes to 0
in probability. In particular, if Q accurately describes the data generating process
then the predictions of P are eventually accurate with high probability.
In this paper, merging is formulated in terms of convergence in probability
rather than almost sure convergence [as in Blackwell and Dubins (1962)]. As is
well known, convergence in probability is particularly convenient in the context of
finitely additive probabilities. See, for instance, the discussion in Berti and Rigo
(2006).
It is clear that for merging to occur, P and Q must be compatible ex-ante. The
notion of absolute continuity formalizes this intuition.
DEFINITION 6. Let P,Q ∈ P. The probability Q is absolutely continuous
with respect to P , that is, Q 	 P , if for every sequence of events (En)∞n=1,
if P(En) → 0 then Q(En) → 0.
If P is σ -additive, then the definition is equivalent to requiring that every event
null under P is also null under Q. Moreover, if P is a Savagean probability and Q
is a probability satisfying Q 	 P , then Q is Savagean as well.
Absolute continuity is (essentially) necessary for merging.
PROPOSITION 1. Let P,Q ∈ P and P(ωt ) > 0 for every cylinder ωt . If P
merges with Q then Q 	 P .
In their seminal paper, Blackwell and Dubins show that when P and Q are
σ -additive then absolute continuity suffices for merging.
THEOREM 1 (Blackwell and Dubins). Let P and Q be σ -additive probability
measures on (,B). If Q 	 P , then P merges with Q.
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One interpretation of the Blackwell–Dubins theorem is that multiple repetitions
of Bayes’ rule lead to an agreement among agents who initially hold compati-
ble opinions. Another interpretation is that the predictions of Bayesian learners
will eventually be accurate (provided that absolute continuity holds). However, the
Blackwell–Dubins theorem does not extend to all opinions. This motivates the next
definition.
DEFINITION 7. A probability P ∈ P satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property
if for every Q ∈ P,
if Q 	 P then P merges with Q.(3.1)
Let BD be the set of all opinions that satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins property.
So, an opinion P satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property if it merges to any
compatible opinion Q. We show in the Appendix that BD is strictly contained
in the set of all opinions. That is, some opinions satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins
property, while others do not. We also show that the set of probabilities satisfying
the Blackwell–Dubins property strictly contains the set of σ -additive probabilities.
We refer the reader to Example 1 and Theorem 10, respectively.
Any exogenously given (or honestly reported) opinion can be tested and re-
jected, whether or not the Blackwell–Dubins property holds. Thus, in the absence
of strategic considerations, the connection between the merging and the testing of
opinions is weak. We now show that this connection is much stronger when there
are incentive problems.
4. Main results.
THEOREM 2. Consider the case where any opinion is allowed. Let T be a
test that -controls for type I errors with probability 1 − ε. The test T can be
manipulated with probability 1 − ε − δ, for every δ ∈ (0,1 − ε].
THEOREM 3. Consider the case where opinions must satisfy the Blackwell–
Dubins property. Fix ε ∈ (0,1]. There exists a test T that BD-controls for type I
error with probability 1 − ε and is nonmanipulable.
If Bob is free to announce any opinion, then he cannot be meaningfully tested
and discredited. Given any test that controls for type I error, Bob can design a
strategy which prevents rejection. However, if Bob is required to announce opin-
ions satisfying the Blackwell–Dubins property, then it is possible to test and dis-
credit him. These results show a strong connection between the merging and the
testing of opinions, but only when there are incentive problems and agents may
misrepresent what they know.
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We now illustrate the basic ideas behind the proof of the two results. The proof
of Theorem 3 relies on a characterization of the set of probabilities that satisfy the
Blackwell–Dubins property. This characterization is also crucial for the proof of
Theorem 4 below. We show that P ∈ P satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property if
and only if it is an extreme point of the set of probabilities E(P ) ⊆ P which agree
with P on every cylinder.
The proof of necessity in this characterization is simple. Suppose, by contradic-
tion, that P can be written as the convex combination P = αQ+ (1 −α)R, where
Q and R belong to E(P ). Clearly, both Q and R are absolutely continuous with
respect to P . However, P does not merge to Q or R. The intuition is that Q and
R agree on every finite history and so, the available data delivers equal support to
them. The converse requires a deeper argument and relies on Plachky’s (1976) the-
orem, which states that P is an extreme point of E(P ) if and only if the probability
of every event can be approximated by the probabilities of cylinders.
Given our characterization, the proof of Theorem 3 can be sketched as follows:
Let P be an opinion satisfying the Blackwell–Dubins property. Given that P is
strongly nonatomic, we can divide  into a partition {A1, . . . ,An} of events such
that each of them has probability less than ε. This property is a direct implication
of Savage’s postulate P6 and plays an important role in our result. For general opin-
ions, the events {A1, . . . ,An} may have no useful structure and may not even be
Borel sets. However, since P is an extreme point of E(P ), we can invoke Plachky’s
theorem a second time and show that each Ai can be chosen to be a cylinder. Now
fix a path ω. Let us say it belongs to A1. By definition, there is a time t such
that ωt = A1. We now define a test T such that T (P ) = ωt (note that the period
t depends on the opinion P because the partition depends on it). By definition,
the test BD-controls for type I errors with probability 1 − ε. Furthermore, it is a
nonmanipulable test. Given any strategy ζ we can find a period m large enough
such that ωm rejects all opinions in the (finite) support of ζ . Therefore, in ωm, the
probability of passing the test under ζ is 0.
We now sketch the proof of Theorem 2. Consider a zero-sum game between
Nature and the expert. Nature chooses an opinion P and the expert chooses a
strategy ζ (a random device producing opinions). The payoff of the expert is the
probability of passing the test. For each opinion P chosen by Nature there exists
a strategy for the expert (to report P ) that gives him a payoff of at least 1 − ε. If
Fan’s (1953) Minmax theorem applies then there exists a strategy ζ that guarantees
the expert a payoff of at least 1 − ε for every opinion chosen by Nature. In this
case, the test is manipulable.
Fan’s Minmax theorem requires Nature’s action space to be compact and her
payoffs to be (lower semi) continuous. The main difficulty is that the set of opin-
ions is not compact in the natural topology, the weak* topology. Hence, Fan’s
Minmax theorem cannot be directly applied. We consider a new game, defined as
above except that Nature can choose any probability in P (not necessarily Sav-
agean). By the Riesz representation and the Banach–Alaoglu theorems, the set
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of all finitely additive probabilities satisfy the necessary continuity and compact-
ness conditions for Fan’s Minmax theorem. However, if now Nature chooses a
non-Savagean probability M , the expert cannot replicate her choice because he is
restricted to opinions.
Based on the celebrated Hammer–Sobczyk decomposition theorem, we show
the following approximation result: For every M ∈ P, there is an opinion P such
that M(U) ≤ P(U) for every union U of cylinders. Thus, M(T (P )) ≤ P(T (P ) ≤
ε. It follows that if Natures chooses M and the expert chooses P then he passes
the test with probability at least 1 − ε. The proof is now concluded invoking Fan’s
Minmax theorem.
5. Category tests. Theorem 3 provides conditions under which it is feasible
to discredit strategic experts. However, even a nonmanipulable test can be strate-
gically passed on some paths. Under σ -additivity, Dekel and Feinberg (2006) and
Olszewski and Sandroni (2009a) construct nonmanipulable category tests, where
uninformed experts fail in all, but a topologically small (i.e., meager) set of paths.
We now show a difficulty in following this approach in the general case of opinions
that satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins property.
DEFINITION 8. A collection I of subsets of  is a strictly proper ideal if it
satisfies the following properties:
(1) If S ∈ I and R ⊆ S then R ∈ I;
(2) If R,S ∈ I then R ∪ S ∈ I; and
(3) No cylinder belongs to I .
A strictly proper ideal is a collection of sets which can be regarded as “small.”
Property (1) is the natural requirement that if a set S is considered small then a set
R contained in S must also be considered small. Properties (2) and (3) are satisfied
by most commonly used notions of “small” sets, such as countable, nowhere dense,
meager, sets of Lebesgue measure zero and shy sets. To clarify our terminology,
recall that an ideal is a collection of subsets satisfying properties (1) and (2). An
ideal is proper if  does not belong to it. We refer to the elements of a strictly
proper ideal as small sets and to their complements as large sets.
Strictly proper ideals can be defined in terms of probabilities. Given P ∈ P,
define a set N to be P -null if there exists an event E that satisfies N ⊆ E and
P(E) = 0. The collection of P -null sets is a strictly proper ideal whenever P
satisfies P(ωt) > 0 for every cylinder ωt .
THEOREM 4. Let I be a strictly proper ideal. There exists an opinion P ∈
BD such that P(E) = 0 for every event E in I .
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There exists an opinion that satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property and finds
all small events to be negligible. The proof of this result relies on the characteriza-
tion of the set BD of opinions satisfying the Blackwell–Dubins property that we
discussed in the previous section. Theorem 4 shows a basic tension between the
control of type I errors and the use of genericity arguments. Suppose Alice intends
to design a test that discredits Bob on a large set of paths, irrespectively of his
strategy. Then the set of paths (T (P ))c that do not reject opinion P must be small
[otherwise Bob could simply announce opinion P and pass the test on (T (P ))c,
a nonsmall set of realizations]. But if P is the opinion obtained from Theorem 4,
we must have P((T (P ))c) = 0. So, the test cannot control for type I errors. We
have just proved the following corollary.
COROLLARY 1. Let I be a strictly proper ideal. For every test T which BD-
controls type I errors with positive probability there exists a strategy ζ such that
the set {
ω : ζ
({
P :ω /∈ T (P )})= 1}
is not small.
Thus, the stronger nonmanipulable tests in Dekel and Feinberg (2006) and Ol-
szewski and Sandroni (2009a) cannot be obtained in the general case of opinions
that satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins property.
6. Extensions. In this section, we extend our analysis to the case where the
set of per-period outcomes may be infinite.
6.1. Setup. Let X be a separable metric space of outcomes and denote by 
the set of paths X∞. As before, ωt is the cylinder of length t ≥ 0 with base ω ∈ 
(in particular ω0 = ). The set  is endowed with the product topology and a
σ -algebra  containing all open sets. We denote by P the set of finitely additive
probabilities on (,) and by  the subset of opinions (i.e., strongly nonatomic
probabilities).
6.2. Conditional probabilities. Let H be the set of all cylinders. We say that a
function
P : ×H→[0,1]
is a conditional probability if for every t ≥ 0 and ω ∈ :
(1) P(·|ωt) ∈ P;
(2) P(ωt |ωt) = 1; and
(3) P(E ∩ωt+n|ωt) = P(E|ωt+n)P (ωt+n|ωt) for any event E and n ≥ 0.
1012 L. POMATTO, N. AL-NAJJAR AND A. SANDRONI
The definition of conditional probability follows Berti, Regazzini and Rigo
(1998), where properties (1)–(3) are justified on the basis of de Finetti’s coher-
ence principle: a real function P defined on  ×H satisfies properties (1)–(3) if
and only if a bookie, who sets P(E|ωt) as the price of a conditional bet on event E,
cannot incur in a Dutch book. We refer the reader to Regazzini (1985, 1987),
de Finetti (1990) and Berti and Rigo (2002) for a precise statement and a formal
discussion.
A conditional probability is a conditional opinion if P(·|) is strongly
nonatomic. We denote by P∗ and by ∗ the sets of conditional probabilities and
conditional opinions, respectively. To simplify the exposition, given an event E
and a conditional probability P , we use the notation P(E) instead of the more
precise P(E|).
At time 0, Bob is required to announce a conditional opinion P . So, a test T is
now a function mapping each conditional opinion P to an open subset T (P ) of .
The definitions of type I errors, manipulable and nonmanipulable tests are analo-
gous to the definitions of Section 2 and can be obtained by replacing  with ∗.
6.3. Merging. We now extend the definition of merging of opinions. We say
that X is a discrete space if it is countable and endowed with the discrete topology.
DEFINITION 9. Let X be a discrete space. If P,Q ∈ P∗, the conditional prob-
ability P merges with Q if for every ε > 0,
lim
t→∞Q
({
ω : sup
E∈
∣∣P (E|ωt )−Q(E|ωt )∣∣> ε})= 0.
The next definition is based on Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
DEFINITION 10. Let X be a discrete space. A conditional probability P sat-
isfies the Blackwell–Dubins property if for every probability Q ∈ P such that
Q 	 P(·|) there exists a conditional probability Q˜ such that
Q˜(·|) = Q and P merges with Q˜.
Let ∗BD be the set of all conditional opinions that satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins
property.
We now show that the connection between testability and merging of opinions
extends to this setup.
6.4. Results.
THEOREM 5. Let X be a separable metric space. Consider the case where any
conditional opinion is allowed. Let T be a test that ∗-controls for type I errors
with probability 1 − ε. The test T can be manipulated with probability 1 − ε − δ,
for every δ ∈ (0,1 − ε].
MERGING AND TESTING OPINIONS 1013
THEOREM 6. Let X be a discrete space. Consider the case where conditional
opinions must satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins property. Fix ε ∈ (0,1]. There exists a
test T that ∗BD-controls for type I error with probability 1 − ε and is nonmanip-
ulable.
If it is possible for Bob to announce any conditional opinion, then he cannot
be meaningfully tested and discredited. If Bob is restricted to conditional opinions
satisfying the Blackwell–Dubins property, then it is possible to test and discredit
him.
The proof of Theorem 5 follows the proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theo-
rem 6 is based on the following result: a conditional opinion P ∈ ∗BD satisfies
limt→∞P(ωt) = 0 for every path ω. This step requires a new argument, because
the characterization of Blackwell–Dubins property used in the proof of Theorem 3
does not readily extend to the case where X is infinite. Once this continuity prop-
erty is shown to hold, the proof continues as in Theorem 3. We fix a path ω and for
each P ∈ ∗BD we choose a large enough period tP such that P(ωtP ) < ε. Because
X is assumed to be a discrete space, each cylinder ωtP is open. Therefore, we can
define test T such that T (P ) = ωtP for every P ∈ ∗BD. Following the proof of
Theorem 3, we show that T is nonmanipulable.
APPENDIX A
We now provide an example of an opinion that violates the Blackwell–Dubins
property.
EXAMPLE 1. Let  = {0,1}∞ and  = B. Denote by X1,X2, . . . the coordi-
nate projections on . For every n ≥ 1, let Pn be the σ -additive probability defined
as
Pn(Xk = 0) = 2−k for k ≤ n and Pn(Xk = 0) = 1 for k > n
and let P∞ be the σ -additive probability defined as P∞(Xk = 0) = 2−k for all k.
Consider the opinion P = 12P∞ + 12
∫
Pn dλ(n), where λ is a finitely additive
probability on (N,2N) such that λ({n}) = 0 for every n. The finite additivity of
the mixture
∫
Pn dλ(n) may reflect the difficulty of predicting when the per-period
probability of observing the outcome 0 will change from 0.5 to 1.
Clearly, P∞ 	 P . However, P does not merge with P∞. To this end, let A be
the set of all paths where the outcome 1 appears infinitely often. Then Pn(A) = 0
for every n and P∞(A) = 1. For every cylinder ωt , we have
P
(
ωt
)= 1
2
P∞
(
ωt
)+ 1
2
∫
{n:n>t}
Pn
(
ωt
)
dλ(n) = P∞(ωt )
1014 L. POMATTO, N. AL-NAJJAR AND A. SANDRONI
and moreover,
P∞
(
A|ωt )− P (A|ωt )= 1 − (1/2)P∞(A∩ωt)+ (1/2) ∫n Pn(A∩ωt) dλ(n)
P∞(ωt )
= 1 − 1
2
P∞
(
A|ωt )
= 1
2
for every ω and every t . Thus, P does not merge with P∞.
A.1. Preliminaries. To minimize repetitions, throughout the Appendix 
stands for either {0,1}∞ or X∞. For every algebra A of subsets of  denote by
P(A) the space of finitely additive probabilities defined on (,A). When A= ,
we write P instead of P(). We denote by  ⊆ P the set of opinions (strongly
nonatomic probabilities). The space P(A) is endowed with the weak* topology.
It is the coarsest topology for which the functional P → ∫ ϕ dP is continuous for
every function ϕ : →R that has finite range and is measurable with respect to A.
This should not be confused with the more common weak* topology generated by
bounded continuous functions.
APPENDIX B: MERGING OF OPINIONS
In this subsection, we describe of the set of opinions on  = {0,1}∞ that satisfy
the Blackwell–Dubins property. We first show that absolute continuity is essen-
tially a necessary condition for merging.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Assume Q is not absolutely continuous with re-
spect to P . Then there exists a sequence of events (En)∞n=1 and some α > 0 such
that P(En) → 0 but Q(En) > α for every n. Suppose P merges with Q. For ev-
ery t , let Ct be a collection of pairwise disjoint cylinders of length t such that
Q(ωt) > 0 for every ωt ∈ Ct and Q(∪Ct ) = 1. Fix δ ∈ (0, α4 ). There exists a time
T large enough such that for every t ≥ T there is a subset Dt ⊆ Ct such that
Q(∪Dt ) ≥ 1 − δ and supE∈ |Q(E|ωt) − P(E|ωt)| ≤ δ for every ωt ∈ Dt . Be-
cause P(ωt ) > 0 for every ωt , the expression P(E|ωt) is well defined. For every
event En,
Q(En) =
∑
ωt∈Dt
Q
(
En|ωt )Q(ωt )+ ∑
ωt∈Ct−Dt
P
(
E|ωt )P (ωt )
hence,
∑
ωt∈Dt Q(En|ωt)Q(ωt ) ≥ α − δ. Define
En =
{
ωt ∈Dt :Q(En|ωt )≥ α2
}
.
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We have
α − δ ≤ ∑
ωt∈Dt
Q
(
En|ωt )Q(ωt )
= ∑
ωt∈En
Q
(
En|ωt )Q(ωt )+ ∑
ωt∈Dt−En
Q
(
En|ωt )Q(ωt )
≤ Q(∪En)+ α2Q(∪Dt − ∪En)
≤ Q(∪En)+ α2
hence, Q(∪En) ≥ α2 − δ. Now let n∗ be large enough such that α2 −P(En∗ |ωt) > δ
for every ω. Then, for every ωt ∈ En∗ ,
sup
E∈
∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣ ≥ Q(En∗ |ωt )− P (En∗ |ωt )
≥ α
2
− P (En∗ |ωt )
> δ.
To summarize, Q({ω : supE∈ |Q(E|ωt)− P(E|ωt)| > δ}) > α2 − δ for every t ≥
T . Therefore, Q(∪Dt ) ≤ 1 − (α2 − δ). By definition, Q(∪Dt ) ≥ 1 − δ; hence,
δ ≥ α4 . A contradiction. Hence, P does not merge with Q. 
Our main result is a characterization of the set of opinions that satisfy the
Blackwell–Dubins property. We first recall some results on extensions of finitely
additive probabilities. Let A1 and A2 be two algebras of subsets of  such that
A1 ⊆A2. Given P ∈ P(A1) and Q ∈ P(A2), call Q an extension of P from A1 to
A2 if P(A) = Q(A) for every A ∈A1. Let E(P,A1,A2) be the set of extensions
of P from A1 to A2. As is well known, the set E(P,A1,A2) is nonempty. More-
over, it is a convex and compact subset of P(A2). The set of extreme points of
E(P,A1,A2) has been studied in great generality. We refer the reader to Lipecki
(2007) and Plachky (1976) for further results and references.
THEOREM 7 [Plachky (1976)]. Fix two algebras A1 ⊆ A2 and P ∈ P(A1).
A probability Q ∈ E(P,A1,A2) is an extreme point of E(P,A1,A2) if and only
if for every ε > 0 and A2 ∈A2 there exists A1 ∈A1 such that Q(A2 A1) < ε.
Let F be the algebra generated by all cylinders of {0,1}∞. An event belongs to
F if and only if it is a finite union of (pairwise disjoint) cylinders. Recall that B
is the Borel σ -algebra induced on  by the product topology. Then F ⊆ B ⊆ .
For every P ∈ P let PF be the restriction of P on F . It is easy to see that PF
is σ -additive. By Carathéodory theorem, it admits a σ -additive extension from F
to B, denoted by Pσ .
The next result is well known.
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LEMMA 1. Let  = {0,1}∞. For all Q and P in P, if QF 	 PF then Qσ 	
Pσ .
We can now state our main result on merging.
THEOREM 8. Let  = {0,1}∞. For every P ∈ P, the following are equivalent:
(1) P is an extreme point of E(PF ,F,).
(2) P satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property.
(3) For all Q,R ∈ P, if P = αQ+ (1−α)R for some α ∈ (0,1) then P merges
with Q and R.
PROOF. (1) ⇒ (2). Let P be an extreme point of E(PF ,F,). If Q 	 P ,
then Qσ 	 Pσ by Lemma 1. By the Blackwell–Dubins theorem,
Qσ
({
ω : lim
t→∞
(
sup
B∈B
∣∣Qσ (B|ωt )− Pσ (B|ωt )∣∣)= 0})= 1.
In particular, the sequence of random variables(
ω → sup
F∈F
∣∣Qσ (F |ωt )− Pσ (F |ωt )∣∣)∞
t=1
converges to 0, Qσ -almost surely. Therefore, the sequence converges in probabil-
ity. For each ε > 0,
lim
t→∞Qσ
({
ω : sup
F∈F
∣∣Qσ (F |ωt )− Pσ (F |ωt )∣∣> ε})= 0.
Since the last expression only involves events belonging to F ,
lim
t→∞Q
({
ω : sup
F∈F
∣∣Q(F |ωt )− P (F |ωt )∣∣> ε})= 0.
The proof is complete by showing that
sup
E∈
∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣= sup
F∈F
∣∣Q(F |ωt )− P (F |ωt )∣∣
for every ωt such that Q(ωt) > 0.
To this end, fix an event E ∈  and a cylinder ωt such that Q(ωt) > 0. By
Plachky’s theorem, there exists a sequence of events (Fn)∞n=1 in F such that P(E
Fn) → 0 as n → ∞. For each n, the inequality∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣≤ ∣∣Q(E|ωt )−Q(Fn|ωt )∣∣
+ ∣∣Q(Fn|ωt )− P (Fn|ωt )∣∣
+ ∣∣P (Fn|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣
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implies∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣
≤ Q(E  Fn|ωt )+ sup
F∈F
∣∣Q(F |ωt )− P (F |ωt )∣∣+ P (E  Fn|ωt ).
Because P(E  Fn) → 0 and Q(ωt) > 0, it follows that P(ωt) > 0 and P(E 
Fn|ωt) → 0. Absolute continuity implies Q(E  Fn|ωt) → 0. Therefore,∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣≤ sup
F∈F
∣∣Q(F |ωt )− P (F |ωt )∣∣
thus
sup
E∈
∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣≤ sup
F∈F
∣∣Q(F |ωt )− P (F |ωt )∣∣
as claimed.
(2) ⇒ (3). If P = αQ+ (1 − α)R then Q 	 P , hence P merges with Q.
(3) ⇒ (1). Assume by way of contradiction that P is not an extreme point of
E(PF ,F,). Then there exist Q,R in E(PF ,F,) such thatP = αQ + (1 −
α)R, α ∈ (0,1) and Q = R. By assumption, P merges with Q. Let Ct be a collec-
tion of pairwise disjoint cylinders of length t such that Q(ωt) > 0 for every ωt ∈ Ct
and Q(∪Ct ) = 1. For every t large enough, there exists a subset Dt ⊆ Ct such that
Q(∪Dt ) ≥ 1 − ε and supE∈ |Q(E|ωt) − P(E|ωt)| ≤ ε for every ωt ∈ Dt . For
every event E,∣∣Q(E)− P(E)∣∣= ∣∣∣∣ ∑
ωt∈Ct
Q
(
E|ωt )Q(ωt )− ∑
ωt∈Ct
P
(
E|ωt )P (ωt )∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
ωt∈Ct
(
P
(
E|ωt )−Q(E|ωt ))Q(ωt )∣∣∣∣
≤ ∑
ω∈Dt
∣∣P (E|ωt )−Q(E|ωt )∣∣Q(ωt )
+ ∑
ω∈Ct−Dt
∣∣P (E|ωt )−Q(E|ωt )∣∣Q(ωt )
≤ εQ(∪Dt )+ (1 −Q(∪Dt ))
≤ 2ε,
where the first two equalities follow from the fact that Q(ωt) = P(ωt ) for all ωt .
Since E and ε are arbitrary, we have P = Q. A contradiction. Therefore, P must
be an extreme point of E(PF ,F,). 
The next result shows a useful property of opinions that satisfy the Blackwell–
Dubins property.
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THEOREM 9. Let  = {0,1}∞. For every P ∈ BD and every ε > 0, there
exists a partition {C1, . . . ,Cn} of  such that for each i = 1, . . . , n, Ci is a cylinder
and P(Ci) ≤ ε.
PROOF. Let P ∈ BD and fix ε > 0. Because P is strongly nonatomic, then
there exists a partition {E1, . . . ,Em} of events such that P(Ei) < ε2 for every i =
1, . . . ,m. By Theorem 8, P is an extreme point of E(PF ,F,). By Plachky’s the-
orem, for each i we can find a sequence (Fi,k)∞k=1 in F such that P(Ei Fi,k) → 0
as k → ∞. Choose K large enough such that P(Ei  Fi,K) < ε2m for each i.
Let F1 = F1,K and define Fi = Fi,K −⋃i−1j=1 Fj,K for each i = 2, . . . ,m. Let
Fm+1 =  − ⋃mi=1 Fi,K and consider the partition {F1, . . . ,Fm+1}. It satisfies
P(Fi) ≤ P(Fi,K) < ε2 + ε2m for each i = 2, . . . ,m. Moreover,
P(Fm+1) = P
((
m⋃
i=1
Ei
)
−
(
m⋃
i=1
Fi,K
))
≤ P
(
m⋃
i=1
(Ei − Fi,K)
)
≤ ε
2
.
Therefore, P(Fi) ≤ ε for each Fi ∈ {F1, . . . ,Fm+1}. Because each Fi is a finite
union of pairwise disjoint cylinders, the proof is complete. 
The next theorem shows that for every sigma additive probability P we can
find a continuum of probabilities that agree with P on every cylinder, fail σ -
additivity but satisfy the Blackwell–Dubins property. A related result appears in
Lipecki (2001).
THEOREM 10. Let  = {0,1}∞. For every σ -additive probability P ∈ P, the
set
{Q ∈ BD :QF = PF ,Q is not σ -additive}
has cardinality at least c.
PROOF. Fix a collection {Dξ : ξ ∈ [0,1]} of pairwise disjoint, Borel and dense
subsets of  [see, e.g., Ceder (1966)]. For every ξ ∈ [0,1], let Aξ be the algebra
generated by F ∪ {Dξ }. That is,
Aξ = {(F1 ∩Dξ)∪ (F2 ∩Dcξ ) :F1,F2 ∈F}.
Let ρξ ∈ P(Aξ ) be defined as
ρξ (F ∩Dξ) = P(F)
for every F ∈F . Because Dξ is dense, then F ∩Dξ =∅ for every F ∈F . Hence,
ρξ is well defined. It satisfies ρξ (Dξ ) = 1.
For each ξ ∈ [0,1] fix an extreme point Pξ of E(ρξ ,Aξ ,). We claim it is
also an extreme point of E(PF ,F,). By construction, Pξ ∈ E(PF ,F,). Now
suppose Pξ = αQ+ (1 − α)R, with α ∈ [0,1] and Q,R ∈ E(PF ,F,). Because
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Pξ (Dξ ) = 1, then Q(Dξ) = R(Dξ) = 1. Hence, P(F) = Q(F ∩ Dξ) = R(F ∩
Dξ) for every F ∈ F . Therefore, Q,R ∈ E(ρξ ,Aξ ,). By assumption, Pξ is an
extreme point of E(ρξ ,Aξ ,). Hence, P = Q = R. This concludes the proof of
the claim.
By Theorem 8, each Pξ satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property. Moreover,
each Pξ agrees with P on every cylinder. Hence, each σ -additive Pξ must agree
with P on every Borel sets. Because the sets {Dξ : ξ ∈ [0,1]} are Borel and pair-
wise disjoint, at most one probability in {Pξ : ξ ∈ [0,1]} agrees with P on every
Borel set. Thus, there exists at most one σ -additive probability in {Pξ : ξ ∈ [0,1]}.
Therefore, the set {Pξ : ξ ∈ [0,1],Pξ = P }, which is included in {Q ∈ BD :QF =
PF ,Q is not σ -additive}, has cardinality c. This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX C: STRONGLY NONATOMIC PROBABILITIES
We now provide a technical result important for the proofs of Theorems 2 and 5.
Throughout this subsection,  =X∞.
A {0,1}-probability is a probability Z ∈ P that satisfies Z(E) ∈ {0,1} for every
E ∈ .
THEOREM 11. Let E ⊆  − {∅} be closed under finite intersection. There
exists a {0,1}-probability Z such that Z(E) = 1 for every E ∈ E .
PROOF. This is a corollary of the ultrafilter theorem. See, for instance,
Aliprantis and Border (2006), Theorem 2.19. 
Every P ∈ P can be decomposed into a strongly nonatomic part and a mixture
of countably many {0,1}-probabilities.
THEOREM 12 [Sobczyk and Hammer (1944)]. For every P ∈ P, there exists
an opinion Ps ∈  and a sequence (Zi)∞i=1 of {0,1}-probabilities such that
P = αPs + (1 − α)
∞∑
i=1
βiZi,
where α,βi ∈ [0,1] for every i and ∑∞i=1 βi = 1.
Given an algebra A, P ∈ P(A) is strongly continuous if for every ε > 0 there
exists a partition {A1, . . . ,An} of  such that Ai ∈A and P(Ai) < ε for every i.
THEOREM 13. Let A be a σ -algebra. A probability P ∈ P(A) is strongly
continuous if and only if it is strongly nonatomic.
PROOF. See Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983), Theorem 11.4.5. 
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THEOREM 14. For every P ∈ P, there exists an opinion P˜ ∈  such that
P(U) ≤ P˜ (U)
for every open set U .
PROOF. We first prove the result for the case where P is a {0,1}-probability.
To this end, fix a {0,1}-probability Z. Let C ={U :U open,Z(U) = 1}. The col-
lection C is closed under finite intersection.
We now construct a sequence (Dn)∞n=1 of countable, dense and pairwise disjoint
subsets of . The proof of this claim proceeds by induction. The space  =X∞ is
separable, so it has a countable dense subset D1. Assume that for some N the sets
D1, . . . ,DN have been defined and satisfy the desired properties. Let (Vk)∞k=1 be a
countable base of  and for each k pick a path ωk ∈ Vk −⋃Nn=1 Dn. Let DN+1 ={ω1,ω2, . . .}. This completes the induction step and the proof of the claim.
For every n, the collection
Cn = {U ∩Dn :U ∈ C}
is closed under finite intersection and does not contain the empty set. By Theo-
rem 11, for every n there exists a {0,1}-probability Zn such that Zn(E) = 1 for
every E ∈ Cn. For each n and for every open set U , if Z(U) = 1 then U ∩Dn ∈ Cn
and Zn(U) = 1. Hence, Z(U) ≤ Zn(U). Let λ be a strongly continuous finitely
additive probability on (N,2N) and define the function Z˜ : → [0,1] as
Z˜(E) =
∫
N
Zn(E)dλ(n)
for every E ∈ .
It follows from the additivity of the integral that Z˜ ∈ P. For every open set U , if
Z(U) = 1 then Z˜(U) = ∫
N
Zn(U)dλ(n) = ∫N 1dλ(n) = 1. Hence, Z(U) ≤ Z˜(U).
It remains to prove that Z˜ is strongly nonatomic. By Theorem 13, it is enough
to prove it is strongly continuous. Fix ε > 0. Since λ is strongly continuous, we
can find a partition {1, . . . ,k} of N such that λ(i) ≤ ε for every i = 1, . . . , k.
Consider now the partition {⋃m∈1 Dm, . . . ,⋃m∈k Dm, (⋃m∈NDm)c} of . For
every i = 1, . . . , k and n, we have Zn(⋃m∈i Dm) = 1i (n) where 1i is the in-
dicator function of i . Therefore,
Z˜
( ⋃
m∈i
Dm
)
=
∫
N
Zn
( ⋃
m∈i
Dm
)
dλ(n)
=
∫
N
1i (n) dλ(n)
= λ(i) ≤ ε
and Z˜((
⋃
m∈NDm)c) = 0. This proves that Z˜ is strongly continuous.
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Now let P be any finitely additive probability. By the Hammer–Sobczyk de-
composition, we can write P as the convex combination
P = αPs + (1 − α)
∞∑
i=1
βiZi,
where Ps is strongly nonatomic and each Zi is a {0,1}-probability. For each i,
let Z˜i be an opinion such that Zi(U) ≤ Z˜i(U) for every open set U . Define
P˜ = αPs + (1 − α)∑∞i=1 βZ˜i . It is easy to see that P˜ is strongly continuous. By
Theorem 13, it is an opinion. For every open set U , we have
P(U) = αPs(U)+ (1 − α)
∞∑
i=1
βiZi(U)
≤ αPs(U)+ (1 − α)
∞∑
i=1
βiZ˜i(U) = P˜ (U)
as desired. 
APPENDIX D: PROOFS OF THEOREMS 2–6
THEOREM 15 [Fan (1953)]. Let X and Y be convex subsets of two vector
spaces. Let f :X × Y → R. If X is compact Hausdorff and f is concave with
respect to Y and convex and lower semicontinuous with respect to X, then
sup
y∈Y
min
x∈X f (x, y) = minx∈X supy∈Y f (x, y).
See Fan (1953) for a more general version of this theorem.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2. Define the function V :P×f −→R as
V (P, ζ ) =
∫
ζ
({
Q ∈  :ω /∈ T (Q)})dP (ω)
for every (P, ζ ) ∈ P × f. The function V is affine in each variable and con-
tinuous with respect to P. The weak* topology is Hausdorff. Moreover, it follows
from the Riesz representation and Banach–Alaoglu theorems that P is compact
[see Aliprantis and Border (2006), Theorems 14.4 and 6.21]. All the conditions of
Fan’s Minmax theorem are verified, therefore,
sup
ζ∈f
min
P∈PV (P, ζ ) = minP∈P supζ∈f
V (P, ζ ).(D.1)
By Theorem 14, for every P ∈ P there exists P˜ ∈  such that P(U) ≤ P˜ (U) for
every open set U . Because T (P˜ ) is an open set, then P(T (P˜ )) ≤ P˜ (T (P˜ )) ≤ ε.
That is, V (P, δP˜ ) = 1 − P(T (P˜ )) ≥ 1 − ε. Thus,
sup
ζ∈f
min
P∈PV (P, ζ ) = minP∈P supζ∈f
V (P, ζ ) ≥ min
P∈PV (P, δP˜ ) ≥ 1 − ε.
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For every δ ∈ (0,1 − ε], there exists a strategy ζ such that V (P, ζ ) > 1 − ε − δ for
every P ∈ P. In particular,
V (δω, ζ ) = ζ ({Q ∈  :ω /∈ T (Q)})≥ 1 − ε − δ
for every path ω. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. Fix ε > 0 and a path ω. By Theorem 9, for every
P ∈ BD we can choose a partition {C1, . . . ,Cn} of cylinders such that P(Ci) < ε
for every i = 1, . . . , n. Let ω ∈ Ci . There exists a time tP such that ωtP = Ci .
Hence, P(ωtP ) < ε. Define a test T as T (P ) = ωtP for every opinion P ∈ BD.
The test BD-controls for type I errors with probability 1 − ε.
Now, let (P1, . . . ,Pn) be the support of a strategy ζ . Choose a time t such that
t ≥ tPi for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then
ωt ⊆
n⋂
i=1
T (Pi)
hence, ζ({P ∈  : ω˜ /∈ T (P )}) = 0 for every path ω˜ in ωt . 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4. Recall that F is the algebra generated by cylinders.
Fix a probability π ∈ P(F) such that π(ωt) → 0 as t → ∞ for every path ω. Now
let I be a strictly proper ideal and consider the collection of events
A= {(F ∩L)∪ S :F ∈F, S ∈ I ∩,Lc ∈ I ∩}.(D.2)
We prove it is an algebra. If (F ∩L)∪ S ∈A, then its complement is equal to
(F ∩L)c ∩ Sc = (Fc ∪Lc)∩ Sc = (Fc ∩ Sc)∪ (Lc ∩ Sc)
since Sc is large and Lc ∩ Sc is small we have that (F c ∩ Sc) ∪ (Lc ∩ Sc) ∈ A.
Using the notation in (D.2), let (F1 ∩ L1) ∪ S1 and (F2 ∩ L2) ∪ S2 belong to A.
Observe that L = L1 ∩ L2 is large and, therefore L1 − L and L2 − L are small.
We can write
(F1 ∩L1)∪ S1 ∪ (F2 ∩L2)∪ S2 = (F1 ∩L)∪ (F2 ∩L)∪ S
(D.3)
= ((F1 ∪ F2)∩L)∪ S,
where S = (F1 ∩ (L1 −L)) ∪ S1 ∪ (F2 ∩ (L2 −L)) ∪ S2 is a union of small sets.
This proves that (F1 ∩ L1) ∪ S1 ∪ (F2 ∩ L2) ∪ S2 ∈A. We conclude that A is an
algebra. By construction, F ⊆A⊆ .
Define a set function π˜ :A→ [0,1] as
π˜
(
(F ∩L)∪ S)= π(F)
for each (F ∩L)∪ S ∈A.
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We verify that π˜ is well defined. Using the notation in (D.2), let (F1∩L1)∪S1 =
(F2 ∩L2)∪ S2. Equivalently,
(F1 ∩ F2 ∩L1)∪ (F1 ∩ Fc2 ∩L1)∪ S1 = (F2 ∩L2)∪ S2.
Therefore, F1 ∩ Fc2 ∩L1 ⊆ S2. Hence, F1 ∩ Fc2 ∩L1 is small. But also F1 ∩ Fc2 ∩
Lc1 ⊆ Lc1 is small, hence F1 ∩ Fc2 is small. The set F1 ∩ Fc2 is either empty or a
union of cylinders. By the definition of strictly proper ideal F1 ∩Fc2 must be empty.
Similarly, F2 ∩Fc1 =∅. Hence, F1 = F2, and π˜((F1 ∩L1)∪ S1) = π˜((F2 ∩L2)∪
S2).
We prove π˜ is additive. Let (F1 ∩L1) ∪ S1 and (F2 ∩L2) ∪ S2 be two disjoint
sets belonging to A. The sets F1 and F2 are disjoint. To see this, notice that F1 ∩
F2 ∩L1 ∩L2 =∅ implies F1 ∩F2 ⊆ (L1 ∪L2)c. The set F1 ∩F2 is either empty or
a union of cylinders. Since (L1 ∪L2)c is small, it must be empty. Let L = L1 ∩L2
and S = (F1 ∩ (L1 −L))∪ S1 ∪ (F2 ∩ (L2 −L))∪ S2. Similar to (D.3), we have
π˜
(
(F1 ∩L1)∪ S1 ∪ (F2 ∩L2)∪ S2)= π˜(((F1 ∪ F2)∩L)∪ S)
= π(F1 ∪ F2)
= π(F1)+ π(F2)
= π˜((F1 ∩L1)∪ S1)+ π˜((F2 ∩L2)∪ S2).
Therefore, π˜ is a finitely additive probability defined on (,A). By construction,
it satisfies π˜(S) = 0 for every S ∈ I ∩.
Consider the set of extensions E(π˜,A,) and let P be one of its extreme
points. We prove that P is an extreme point of E(π,F,). Write P as P = αQ+
(1 − α)R with Q,R ∈ E(π,F,). Let π˜Q and π˜R be the restriction of Q and R
on A. Since P is an extension of π˜ , we have π˜ = απ˜Q + (1−α)π˜R . We claim that
π˜ = π˜Q = π˜R . For every S ∈ I ∩ , since π˜(S) = 0, then π˜Q(S) = π˜R(S) = 0.
Therefore,
π˜Q
(
(F ∩L)∪ S)= π˜Q(F ∩L) = π˜Q(F ) = π(F) = π˜((F ∩L)∪ S)
for every event (F ∩ L) ∪ S ∈ A. The same is true for π˜R . Therefore, π˜Q =
π˜R = π˜ . This proves that Q,R ∈ E(π˜,A,). Because P is an extreme point of
E(π˜,A,), then P = Q = R. This concludes the proof that P is an extreme point
of E(π,F,). By Theorem 8, P satisfies the Blackwell–Dubins property.
It remains to prove that P is strongly nonatomic. Since π(ωt) → 0 for every
ω, π is strongly continuous. A fortiori, P is strongly continuous and also strongly
nonatomic by Theorem 13. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5. Define the function V :P×f∗ →R as
V (P, ζ ) =
∫
ζ
({
Q ∈ ∗ :ω /∈ T (Q)})dP (ω)
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for all (P, ζ ) ∈ P× f∗. Given P ∈ P, by Theorem 14 there exists an opinion
Q such that P(U) ≤ Q(U) for every open set U . By Theorem 4 in Regazzini
(1985), we can find a conditional opinion Q∗ ∈ ∗ such that Q = Q∗(·|). Then
P(T (Q∗)) ≤ Q(T (Q∗)) = Q∗(T (Q∗)) ≤ ε. The proof is complete by replicating
the argument used in the proof of Theorem 2. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 6. We first prove that for every P ∈ ∗BD and every
path ω, limt P (ωt ) = 0. We argue by contradiction. Let ωo be a path such that
inft P (ωto) = δ > 0. Fix a sequence of positive real numbers (ξt ) such that
P
(
ωto
)= δ + ξt
for every t .
Fix ε ∈ (0, 12). Because P is strongly nonatomic, for every time t we can find
an event F t ⊆ ωt0 such that P(F t ) = 12P(ωt0). For every n, we have
P
(
F t |ωt+n0
)= P(F t ∩ωt+no )
P (ωt+no )
= P(F
t )− P(ωto −ωt+no )
δ + ξt+n
= (1/2)(δ + ξt )− (ξt − ξt+n)
δ + ξt+n =
1
2
δ + ξt
δ + ξt+n −
ξt − ξt+n
δ + ξt+n .
We can therefore fix t¯ large enough such that F = F t¯ satisfies P(F |ωt0) ∈ (12 −
ε, 12 + ε) for every t > t¯ .
Let Q be the opinion defined as
Q(E) = P(E ∩ F)
P (F )
for every event E. Then Q 	 P(·|). By Theorem 4 in Regazzini (1985), we can
find a conditional opinion Q˜ satisfying Q˜(·|) = Q. The proof of the claim will
be concluded by showing that P does not merge with Q˜. Note that for every t > t¯
Q˜
(
ωt0
)= P(F ∩ωt0)
P (ωt0)
P (ωt0)
P (F )
= P (F |ωt0) P(ωt0)
(1/2)P (ωt¯0)
= P (F |ωt0)2δ + ξtδ + ξt¯
hence, for all t > t¯
Q˜
(
ωt0
)≥ (1 − 2ε) δ
δ + ξt¯ .
Moreover, for every t > t¯,
Q˜
({
ω : sup
E
∣∣Q(E|ωt )− P (E|ωt )∣∣> 1
2
− ε
})
> Q˜
({
ω :P
(
F |ωt )< 1
2
+ ε
})
≥ Q˜(ωt0),
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where the first equality follows from Q˜(F |ωt0) = 1 and the second equality follows
from P(F |ωt0) < 12 + ε. Because the sequence (Q˜(ωt¯0), Q˜(ωt¯+10 ), . . .) is bounded
away from 0, P does not merge to Q˜. Therefore, we can conclude that for every
P ∈ ∗BD and every path ω, limt P (ωt ) = 0.
Now fix a path ω and ε > 0. We can find for every P ∈ ∗BD a time tP such that
P(ωtP ) < ε. Because X is endowed with the discrete topology, ωtP is an open set.
Let T (P ) = ωtP for every P ∈ ∗BD. The test ∗BD-controls for type I error with
probability 1 − ε. The same argument in the proof of Theorem 3 shows that T is
nonmanipulable. 
Acknowledgements. We thank Ehud Kalai, Wojciech Olszewski, Eran
Shmaya, Marciano Siniscalchi and Rakesh Vohra for useful discussions. We are
grateful to the Editor and the referees for their thoughtful comments, for simpli-
fying Example 1 and for stimulating the results in Section 6. We also thank the
seminar audiences at the Fifth Transatlantic Theory Workshop, the Summer meet-
ing of the Econometric Society 2012, XIII Latin American Workshop in Economic
Theory, the 4th Workshop on Stochastic Methods in Game Theory, the Washing-
ton University seminar series and the Paris Game Theory Seminar. All errors are
ours.
REFERENCES
AL-NAJJAR, N., POMATTO, L. and SANDRONI, A. (2013). An economic model of induction.
Mimeo.
AL-NAJJAR, N. I. and WEINSTEIN, J. (2008). Comparative testing of experts. Econometrica 76
541–559. MR2406865
AL-NAJJAR, N. I., SANDRONI, A., SMORODINSKY, R. and WEINSTEIN, J. (2010). Testing theories
with learnable and predictive representations. J. Econom. Theory 145 2203–2217. MR2888863
ALIPRANTIS, C. D. and BORDER, K. C. (2006). Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s
Guide, 3rd ed. Springer, Berlin. MR2378491
BABAIOFF, M., BLUMROSEN, L., LAMBERT, N. and REINGOLD, O. (2011). Only valuable experts
can be valued. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 221–222.
ACM.
BERTI, P., REGAZZINI, E. and RIGO, P. (1998). Well-calibrated, coherent forecasting systems. The-
ory Probab. Appl. 42 82–102.
BERTI, P. and RIGO, P. (2002). On coherent conditional probabilities and disintegrations. Ann. Math.
Artif. Intell. 35 71–82. MR1899945
BERTI, P. and RIGO, P. (2006). Finitely additive uniform limit theorems. Sankhya¯ 68 24–44.
MR2301563
BHASKARA RAO, K. P. S. and BHASKARA RAO, M. (1983). Theory of Charges: A Study of Finitely
Additive Measures. Pure and Applied Mathematics 109. Academic Press, New York. MR0751777
BLACKWELL, D. and DUBINS, L. (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing information. Ann.
Math. Statist. 33 882–886. MR0149577
CEDER, J. (1966). On maximally Borel resolvable spaces. Rev. Roumaine Math. Pures Appl. 11
89–94. MR0206900
1026 L. POMATTO, N. AL-NAJJAR AND A. SANDRONI
CESA-BIANCHI, N. and LUGOSI, G. (2006). Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge Univ.
Press, Cambridge. MR2409394
D’ARISTOTILE, A., DIACONIS, P. and FREEDMAN, D. (1988). On merging of probabilities.
Sankhya¯ Ser. A 50 363–380. MR1065549
DAWID, A. P. (1985). Calibration-based empirical probability. Ann. Statist. 13 1251–1285.
MR0811493
DE FINETTI, B. (1990). Theory of Probability. Wiley, Chicester.
DEKEL, E. and FEINBERG, Y. (2006). Non-Bayesian testing of a stochastic prediction. Rev. Econom.
Stud. 73 893–906. MR2260750
DIACONIS, P. and FREEDMAN, D. (1986). On the consistency of Bayes estimates. Ann. Statist. 14
1–26. MR0829555
FAN, K. (1953). Minimax theorems. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 39 42–47. MR0055678
FEINBERG, Y. and LAMBERT, N. (2011). Mostly calibrated. Mimeo.
FEINBERG, Y. and STEWART, C. (2008). Testing multiple forecasters. Econometrica 76 561–582.
MR2406866
FORTNOW, L. and VOHRA, R. V. (2009). The complexity of forecast testing. Econometrica 77 93–
105. MR2477844
FOSTER, D. P. and VOHRA, R. (2011). Calibration: Respice, adspice, prospice. Mimeo.
FOSTER, D. P. and VOHRA, R. V. (1998). Asymptotic calibration. Biometrika 85 379–390.
MR1649119
FOSTER, D. and YOUNG, P. (2001). On the impossibility of predicting the behavior of rational
agents. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98 12848–12853.
FOSTER, D. P. and YOUNG, H. P. (2003). Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
Games Econom. Behav. 45 73–96. MR2022861
FUDENBERG, D. and KREPS, D. M. (1993). Learning mixed equilibria. Games Econom. Behav. 5
320–367. MR1227915
FUDENBERG, D. and LEVINE, D. K. (1998). The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press Series
on Economic Learning and Social Evolution 2. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. MR1629477
FUDENBERG, D. and LEVINE, D. K. (1999). An easier way to calibrate. Games Econom. Behav. 29
131–137. MR1729313
FUDENBERG, D. and LEVINE, D. K. (2009). Learning and equilibrium. Annu. Rev. Econ. 1 385–
420.
GRADWOHL, R. and SALANT, Y. (2011). How to buy advice. Mimeo.
GRADWOHL, R. and SHMAYA, E. (2013). Tractable falsification. Mimeo.
HART, S. and MAS-COLELL, A. (2013). Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-Matching to Un-
coupled Dynamics. World Scientific, Singapore.
HU, T. W. and SHMAYA, E. (2013). Expressible inspections. Theor. Econ. 8 263–280. MR3062153
JACKSON, M. O., KALAI, E. and SMORODINSKY, R. (1999). Bayesian representation of stochastic
processes under learning: de Finetti revisited. Econometrica 67 875–893. MR1693917
KALAI, E. and LEHRER, E. (1993a). Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 61
1019–1045. MR1234792
KALAI, E. and LEHRER, E. (1993b). Subjective equilibrium in repeated games. Econometrica 61
1231–1240. MR1234796
LEHRER, E. (2001). Any inspection is manipulable. Econometrica 69 1333–1347. MR1848782
LEHRER, E. and SMORODINSKY, R. (1996a). Compatible measures and merging. Math. Oper. Res.
21 697–706. MR1403312
LEHRER, E. and SMORODINSKY, R. (1996b). Merging and learning. In Statistics, Probability and
Game Theory. Institute of Mathematical Statistics Lecture Notes—Monograph Series 30 147–
168. IMS, Hayward, CA. MR1481779
LIPECKI, Z. (2001). Cardinality of the set of extreme extensions of a quasi-measure. Manuscripta
Math. 104 333–341. MR1828879
MERGING AND TESTING OPINIONS 1027
LIPECKI, Z. (2007). On compactness and extreme points of some sets of quasi-measures and mea-
sures. IV. Manuscripta Math. 123 133–146. MR2306629
MONDERER, D., SAMET, D. and SELA, A. (1997). Belief affirming in learning processes.
J. Econom. Theory 73 438–452.
NACHBAR, J. H. (1997). Prediction, optimization, and learning in repeated games. Econometrica 65
275–309. MR1433485
NACHBAR, J. H. (2001). Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information. Soc.
Choice Welf. 18 303–326. MR1838240
NACHBAR, J. H. (2005). Beliefs in repeated games. Econometrica 73 459–480. MR2117239
OLSZEWSKI, W. (2011). Calibration and expert testing. Mimeo.
OLSZEWSKI, W. and PESKI, M. (2011). The principal agent approach to testing-experts. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 89–113.
OLSZEWSKI, W. and SANDRONI, A. (2007). Contracts and uncertainty. Theor. Econ. 2 1–13.
OLSZEWSKI, W. and SANDRONI, A. (2008). Manipulability of future-independent tests. Economet-
rica 76 1437–1466. MR2468602
OLSZEWSKI, W. and SANDRONI, A. (2009a). A nonmanipulable test. Ann. Statist. 37 1013–1039.
MR2502659
OLSZEWSKI, W. and SANDRONI, A. (2009b). Strategic manipulation of empirical tests. Math. Oper.
Res. 34 57–70. MR2542989
OLSZEWSKI, W. and SANDRONI, A. (2011). Falsifiability. American Economic Review 101 788–
818.
PLACHKY, D. (1976). Extremal and monogenic additive set functions. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 54
193–196. MR0419711
REGAZZINI, E. (1985). Finitely additive conditional probabilities. Rend. Sem. Mat. Fis. Milano 55
69–89. MR0933711
REGAZZINI, E. (1987). de Finetti’s coherence and statistical inference. Ann. Statist. 15 845–864.
MR0888444
SANDRONI, A. (1998). Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to Nash equilibrium:
The almost absolute continuity hypothesis. Games Econom. Behav. 22 121–147. MR1604792
SANDRONI, A. (2003). The reproducible properties of correct forecasts. Internat. J. Game Theory
32 151–159. MR2046685
SANDRONI, A., SMORODINSKY, R. and VOHRA, R. V. (2003). Calibration with many checking
rules. Math. Oper. Res. 28 141–153. MR1961271
SAVAGE, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York. MR0063582
SCHERVISH, M. and SEIDENFELD, T. (1990). An approach to consensus and certainty with increas-
ing evidence. J. Statist. Plann. Inference 25 401–414. MR1064433
SHMAYA, E. (2008). Many inspections are manipulable. Theor. Econ. 3 367–382.
SOBCZYK, A. and HAMMER, P. C. (1944). A decomposition of additive set functions. Duke Math.
J. 11 839–846. MR0011164
STEWART, C. (2011). Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing. J. Econom. Theory 146 2029–2041.
MR2887773
VOVK, V. and SHAFER, G. (2005). Good randomized sequential probability forecasting is always
possible. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. B Stat. Methodol. 67 747–763. MR2210691
WALKER, S. G., LIJOI, A. and PRÜNSTER, I. (2005). Data tracking and the understanding of
Bayesian consistency. Biometrika 92 765–778. MR2234184
YOUNG, H. P. (2002). On the limits to rational learning. European Economic Review 46 791–799.
1028 L. POMATTO, N. AL-NAJJAR AND A. SANDRONI
YOUNG, P. (2004). Strategic Learning and Its Limits. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, UK.
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES DEPARTMENT
KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
2001 SHERIDAN ROAD
EVANSON, ILLINOIS 60208
USA
E-MAIL: l-pomatto@kellogg.northwestern.edu
al-najjar@kellogg.northwestern.edu
sandroni@kellogg.northwestern.edu
URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/pomatto/index.htm
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/directory/al-najjar_nabil.aspx
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/directory/sandroni_alvaro.aspx
